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Despite its wide acceptance and its seemingly uncontroversial character, the methodological divide 
between abstraction and idealization in political theory, if carefully examined, reveals itself to be 
worthless and counterproductive. In this paper, my attempt will be to show why we should overcome 
this well-established distinction, originally introduced by Onora O’Neill. I claim that there are two 
fundamental reasons for doing so. Firstly, this methodological divide does not give any substantive 
advice in order to build a normative political argument – I will call this first rebuttal the irrelevancy 
objection. Secondly, and more problematically, the divide contributes to obscure some crucial 
methodological issues that should be directly faced and clarified – I will call this second challenge the 
misguidance objection. Both objections are grounded on the idea that O'Neill endorses a naive and 
insufficient conception of description. Indeed, the distinction between abstraction and idealization 
refers to some features of the description adopted: it depends exclusively on its truthfulness or 
falsehood. Specifically, abstractions are subtractions of true predicates, idealizations are additions of 
false predicates. According to this distinction, for O'Neill idealization should be avoided, while 
abstractions are necessary. However, I maintain that focusing merely on the truth or falsehood of 
premises obscures the relevant methodological relationship, which is triadic and not binary. Indeed, 
the description a theory endorses is never selected just for its truth-value. The relevant methodological 
link is not that between theory and (the truth-value of) descriptive assumptions, but runs over a 
triangulation between theory, descriptive assumptions and criterion of appropriateness. As a 
consequence I claim that, even if there is a fundamental logical difference between abstraction and 
idealization, this sharp divide is methodologically unfruitful: focusing solely on such a binary 






















Abstraction and Idealization: an Irrelevant and Misguiding Methodological Divide 
 
I – Introduction 
Despite its wide acceptance and its seemingly uncontroversial character1, the methodological 
divide between abstraction and idealization in political theory, if carefully examined, reveals itself to 
be worthless and counterproductive. In this paper, my attempt will be to show why we should 
overcome this well-established distinction, originally introduced by Onora O’Neill2. I claim that there 
are two fundamental reasons for doing so. Firstly, this methodological divide does not give any 
substantive advice in order to build a normative political argument – I will call this first rebuttal the 
irrelevancy objection. Secondly, and more problematically, the divide contributes to obscure some 
crucial methodological issues that should be directly faced and clarified – I will call this second 
challenge the misguidance objection. I do not intend to sustain, as some authors do3, that the O’Neill’s 
divide should be rejected because we cannot properly differentiate between abstraction and 
idealization. Indeed, I maintain that there is a fundamental logical distinction between these two 
argumentative strategies; nonetheless, from a methodological point of view such a sharp dichotomy is 
at best useless, at worst harmful. 
 
II – Onora O’Neill’s distinction between abstraction and idealization 
The distinction between abstraction and idealization O’Neill defends4 is originally meant to give 
an answer to a fundamental methodological problem in normative political theory: should our 
theorizing about normative issues be pursued from an abstract point of view in which concrete reality 
is – to some degree – ignored? The fear that lies behind these concerns is related to a double set of 
problems: typically those who question the use of abstractions worry about the inadequacy of 
unrealistic prescriptions and the dangers their implementation might involve. It is indeed claimed that 
principles identified by assuming an abstract description of agents and society are insufficient to 
address the variety and specificity of concrete moral dilemmas, as they assume just a partial picture of 
social reality and its injustices5. But besides leading to an impoverished account of ethical life, 
abstraction is often accused of strengthening injustices, because it results insensitive to relevant social 
differences that should instead be protected6. 
However, according to O'Neill, the majority of these critics is misdirected. The real target of such 
complaints is idealization, not abstraction. For O'Neill, there is a fundamental logical difference 
between these two methodological strategies. Both strategies concern the descriptive assumptions that 
must lie at the basis of a normative argument, but they do so in opposite ways. Abstraction consists in 
“bracketing” some of the predicates that are attributed to a true description of the agents or objects 
that are involved in the argument. Basically, there is a set of predicates that can be truly attributed to a 
certain subject and we consider just some of them as relevant to the argument. By doing so, for 
O'Neill, we are preserving the truthfulness of the description: we assume some of the true facts which 
belonged to the original true description. Therefore, abstract reasoning is truth-preserving7. On the 
contrary, idealization consists in “adding” some predicates to the original true description. When we 
                                                             
1  See especially Farrelly [2007], Mills [2005]. 
2  O’Neill [1987]. 
3  See Lawford-Smith [2010], p. 366; Stemplowska [2008], p. 327. 
4  See especially O'Neill [1987], pp. 56-57; O'Neill [1996], pp. 39-44; O'Neill [2000], pp. 143-156. 
5  For critics along these lines see Sandel [1982] and Taylor [1985]. 
6  See for example Okin [1987]. 
7  O'Neill [1996], p. 40. 
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idealize, we affirm something which is not included within the set of the predicates that belong to all 
the members of the class of subjects we are examining8. For this reason, idealization leads to 
falsehoods: by idealizing, we derive a false description from a true one. According to this definition, it 
seems possible to idealize in two distinct ways: we could either introduce some descriptive elements 
ex novo (e.g. by claiming that all humans are perfectly rational), or we could consider one of the 
predicates that is truthfully ascribed to a subset of the subjects considered and extending it to all the 
members of the set (e.g. by claiming that all humans have a IQ of 200). 
That is why, for O'Neill, idealized assumptions are the actual responsible of the worries raised 
above. By idealizing we cannot, by any means, derive a normative framework that can be 
appropriately applied to reality. Either we risk promoting sectarian prescriptions and enforcing 
injustice (if some of the existing predicates are extended to all the members) or we end up defending a 
normative account which is not adequate for human reality (if we invent some of its features). 
Abstraction, on the other hand, is innocuous and necessary. O'Neill explicitly claims that, involving 
language, reasoning can never be fully determinate9. But more importantly, abstraction allows us to 
avoid sectarianism. Indeed, finding a universal normative framework does not obscure and threaten 
existing differences. On the contrary, it is the sole means we have to avoid prescriptions that tacitly 
accept established discriminations. So, besides being logically necessary, abstraction is normatively 
desirable. 
 
III – A“description of a thing” and a “good description to give” 
Following O'Neill's account, we are left with a specific methodological prescription: in practical 
reasoning, while we need to abstract, we should avoid idealizations10. This recommendation seems 
intuitively plausible: after all, if some prescriptions assume a fictitious account of reality, how and 
why should we apply them? For this reason, this methodological suggestion is prima facie appealing. 
My contention is not that such a worry is baseless, or that we should not pay attention to the kind 
of facts we assume in our normative framework. Nor I maintain that both abstraction and idealization 
offer a false picture of reality, so that we should not really care about the distinction. Rather, I want to 
claim that such a methodological divide tells only a very partial story of the relationship between 
practical reasoning and descriptive assumptions. As this account sheds light only on some features of 
that relationship, the divide is unsatisfactory for two reasons: it cannot give significant 
methodological indications and it contributes to obscure core methodological issues whose 
clarification is of primary importance. For these reasons, O'Neill's divide is irrelevant and misguiding. 
The problem at the basis of O'Neill account lies in the rationale of the divide. The distinction 
between abstraction and idealization refers to some features of the description adopted: it depends 
exclusively on its truthfulness or falsehood. If the description is assumed by subtracting predicates, it 
is true and we are dealing with an abstraction; if the description is assumed by adding predicates, it is 
                                                             
8  Ivi, p. 41. 
9  O'Neill [1987], p. 55. 
10  To give a fair picture of O'Neill's perspective, it must be said that she does not exclude altogether a role for 
idealized reasoning. There are places where she suggests that idealizations may play an important role in specific forms of 
reasoning. For example, idealized assumptions (such as frictionless motion or perfect vacuum) may be necessary in scientific 
explanations. They may also have a point in economic research; we have indeed acquired knowledge about human behaviour 
by developing models of rational choice. Hence, strictly speaking, idealization is not problematic per se. Idealized 
assumptions should be carefully excluded just from practical reasoning, not from theoretical reasoning. See, O'Neill [1996], 
pp. 41-42 and O'Neill [2000], p. 151. 
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false and we are dealing with an idealization11. However, such a criterion of selecting descriptive 
assumptions for normative theories rests on an insufficient understanding of what describing entails. 
Surely, O'Neill is right when she says that every reasoning presupposes a sort of abstraction, if by 
that we mean a “simplification”. In every kind of reasoning we assume a set of concepts which 
represents a partial picture of reality. Every time we endorse a description, we are logically obliged to 
detach from reality, because the account of facts we could endorse in our theory can never fully 
replicate reality. But this just means that we are obliged to abstract, and the simple recognition that we 
need to do it does not tell anything about how to do it. Looking carefully to what describing involves, 
we discover a complex procedure which cannot be reduced to the mere selection of true statements. 
Precisely because it involves a selection of facts, assuming a description means making a choice – 
as Amartya Sen would say12. Indeed, I take from Sen the distinction between a “description of a 
thing” and a “good description to give”13 in order to explain the necessity of introducing a third 
element between prescription and descriptive assumptions: the criterion of appropriateness. In fact, 
endorsing a description entails choosing which are the relevant facts we need to introduce in our 
argument. In this sense, a description is much more than a simple true picture – even if partial – of 
reality. Describing means deliberately selecting which facts are to be considered relevant for a theory, 
according to some implicit criterion which justifies the choice. In other words, the choice to adopt 
certain descriptive assumptions depends on the specific purposes and constraints we attribute to our 
theory. For a straightforward example, it makes no sense to consider the average height of adult 
humans when discussing issues of justice. For this reason, there is a crucial difference between a 
“description of a thing” and a “good description to give”: the first is the sum of all the true predicates 
of that thing, the second is the selection of the relevant predicates according to some purposes. 
Therefore, merely focusing on the truth or falsehood of premises obscures the relevant 
methodological relationship, which is triadic and not binary. The relevant link is not that between 
theory and (the truth-value of) descriptive assumptions, but runs over a triangulation between theory, 
descriptive assumptions and criterion of appropriateness. 
 
IV – Two objections 
By emphasizing only the link between theory and truth-value of the description, some 
methodological problems arise which make this account unsatisfactory. 
Firstly, as the third component of the relationship – the appropriateness – is overlooked, we are left 
with a methodological criterion which is irrelevant because insufficient and unnecessary to the 
elaboration of a normative theory. On the one hand, O'Neill's divide is insufficient because within the 
set of the true predicates ascribed to a thing, there are potentially infinite true subsets we could 
choose. Saying merely that we must avoid false predicates is not enough informative, actually it says 
almost nothing about how we should choose the set of true descriptive premises14. O'Neill's criterion 
                                                             
11  I leave momentarily aside the question of whether this is a good association. I turn back to this point in the final 
part saying that sometimes, if falsehood is understood in an specific way, a simple abstraction may be considered false. 
12  Sen [1980], pp. 353-354. 
13  Ivi, p. 355. 
14  A criticism that can be interestingly read along these lines is the one advanced by Martha Nussbaum. Nussbaum 
maintains that although O'Neill is right in defending the dismissal of idealizations, she fails to propose an adequate 
abstraction. O'Neill's proposal is indeed deeply influenced by Kantian ethics. She starts from a very narrow account of 
human nature and social life: she recognizes that the problem of justice can be dealt with only if a plurality of potentially 
conflicting agents does exists, moreover these agents need to be thought as minimally rational, as they must be able to follow 
some sort of social life and to be committed to some means in order to gain any personal ends (minimal notion of 
instrumental rationality), (O'Neill [1990], pp. 212-213). According to Nussbaum, this approach is too thin on content. Such 
an approach is indeed unable to understand properly ethical life and to address real conflicts of values. For Nussbaum we 
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fails almost immediately to give methodological guidance: we need to develop additional instruments 
in order to select the correct set of true premises. As explained above, we need to focus on the 
appropriateness of descriptions according to the different theoretical purposes. Therefore, on the other 
hand, O'Neill's methodological suggestion is also unnecessary, because focusing on the connection 
between descriptions, kinds of theories and criteria of appropriateness we do consider O'Neill's 
worries but we also develop a more complex methodological framework. Indeed, by judging the 
appropriateness of descriptions we are forced to consider whether the premises of our theories should 
be true. For every kind of theoretical purpose in practical reasoning we must ask ourselves whether 
false premises undermine their accomplishment. Therefore, we can give relevance to the truth or 
falsehood of premises but we are not limited to that because appropriateness comprises the evaluation 
of truth-values but goes beyond it. 
Consequently, O'Neill's divide cannot furnish proper methodological guidance and does not add 
anything to the alternative triadic framework here suggested. Hence, it fails because it is 
methodologically irrelevant. 
Secondly, the binary relationship that O'Neill identifies misguides the debate, it contributes to 
neglect methodological issues that should be directly discussed. I find particularly useful to clarify 
this second objection with an example: a paradigmatic case of methodological issue which cannot be 
properly addressed with O'Neill's tools is precisely the one of idealizations.  
O'Neill excludes idealization on the grounds that false premises are unacceptable in practical 
reasoning. In fact, O'Neill's rejection of idealizations is founded on the claim that false descriptive 
assumptions lead to prescriptive accounts which are inapplicable to the human case because both 
unfeasible and dangerous. This means that such a rejection is based on a precise account of the role of 
practical reasoning: according to her reading, practical reasoning is action-guiding in a specific sense 
– it has to lead to prescriptions directly applicable to reality. But, if we now realize that the relevant 
methodological relationship is the triadic one proposed above, then the reason which originally 
motives O'Neill's rejection of idealization ceases to hold. Indeed, if a description is chosen not merely 
according to its truth-value, but because it is appropriate for a specific theoretical purpose, it is no 
more sound to dismiss idealizations simply because they assume false descriptions. In order to reject 
idealizations we would have instead to show that in practical reasoning there are no possible 
theoretical purposes, beyond action-guiding purposes, that might require the use of idealizations. In 
other words, we would have to show that, besides being inappropriate for action-guiding theories, 
idealizations can serve no roles in practical reasoning15. 
Therefore, O'Neill's divide is misguiding because it focuses on the wrong kind of questions: we do 
not have to ask which is the truth-value of a description, we should rather understand i) which are the 
different theoretical purposes in practical reasoning and ii) which premises are appropriate to each of 
them. 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
should start instead from an idea of the human being and human functioning. We should understand what aspects of living 
humans understand as having such importance that they could not define their life as fully human without them (Nussbaum 
[1993], p. 327). Hence, while they agree on the necessity of abstractions, they disagree about the appropriateness of the 
respective descriptive assumptions. 
15  There are many authors who defend a role for false assumptions in practical reason. Zofia Stemplowska, for 
example, argues that false assumptions are not inevitably useless, on the contrary they may be necessary to answer some 
specific questions. In particular, Stemplowska attributes two roles to the kind of idealizations we are here considering. First, 
assuming false descriptions may enlighten how crucial are certain real constraint in shaping our conception of justice (e.g. 
we would change idea about what justice requires if we thought human nature more malleable). Second, introducing falsities 
might help to clarify the relationship between two principles (Stemplowska [2008], pp. 326-329). Robert Goodin arguments 
along similar lines, see Goodin [1995], pp. 42-45. 
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Hence, following this line of argument the division proposed by O'Neill should be interpreted not 




Descriptions may be: 
 True → Abstraction – Appropriate 
       – Inappropriate → revise or reject theory 
 False → Idealization – Appropriate 
       – Inappropriate → revise or reject theory  
 
So, besides being unable to furnish methodological guidance while abstracting, O'Neill's divide 
diverts the attention from the relevant methodological issues which are in need of clarification: the 
connection between theories, their purpose and descriptive assumptions and, consequently, the role of 
idealizations. For this reason, I maintain that O'Neill divide is methodologically misguiding. 
 
V – Against the equivalence between abstraction and idealization 
In this final section, I attempt to clarify my position by contrasting a classical argument against 
O'Neill's divide. The objection typically runs as follows: i) abstractions are subtractions of some 
predicates, ii) being so, abstractions picture a simplified version of reality, iii) abstractions therefore 
exclude some features of reality, iv) consequently, abstractions affirm the absence of some true 
predicates, i.e. they are false descriptions of reality16. According to this line of argument abstractions 
must be regarded as false as idealizations, and for this reason the divide collapses. The basic problem 
is that addition and subtraction are interchangeable, because subtractions are additions of negations. 
Hence, the divide is no more justified; moreover, when we describe something we are always 
affirming some falsities.  
However, this argument is based on a mistaken comprehension of the operation of subtraction. 
Subtracting here involves – as O'Neill explains – the “bracketing” of certain predicates. This means 
that we must interpret the subtraction of some predicates as an operation which brings descriptions to 
a higher level of generality. So, for instance, if human beings are all those objects which are described 
by the predicates xyz, when we decide to consider only those entities described by the predicates xy 
we are assuming a description which includes all human beings, but applies also to other entities (e.g. 
xyw). 
For this reason, behind the argument lies a confusion between generalization and identification. 
When we say “human beings are xy” we could either mean that human beings are defined by those 
properties (identification) or that xy are some of the properties human beings happen to have 
(generalization). So, for what has been said, when we abstract and consider a description of human 
beings, we are not committed to a statement of identity. If abstractions were identifications the 
argument would be sound: describing human beings as xy, would coincide with asserting the negation 
of all other possible properties. But abstractions are generalizations: describing human beings as xy, 
means that those entities that are ¬x or ¬y cannot possibly be human beings, but this description does 
not negate the existence of other properties which might belong to them. 
                                                             
16  See n. 3. 
According to the theory's 
purpose 
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So, technically abstraction and idealization cannot be equalized. It would be hard saying that 
describing men as provided with limited instrumental rationality (abstraction) and describing them as 
perfectly rational (idealization) are two equally false descriptions. 
The point that is worth emphasising here is that these objections grasp something, but what they 
correctly notice is not that every description is false. They point out instead that sometimes it seems 
intuitively correct to judge an abstraction as false, to recognize that it does not offer a sufficient nor 
reliable picture of reality as it is. But if I am right in maintaining that, strictly speaking, every 
abstraction pictures some true aspects of reality, the real problem concerning this kind of abstractions 
is not that they are properly “false”; rather, they are inappropriate with respect to the theoretical 
purpose they need to serve. They seem to distort reality because we perceive that something crucial is 
missing17. 
To sum up, if it is superficial dividing between abstraction and idealization according to the truth-
value of the respective descriptions, it is even more obfuscatory claiming that every description is 
false. However, what these objections partly suggest, and what I maintain, is that we need a more 
informed analysis of what it means to describe in practical reasoning. It is indeed necessary to provide 
a more detailed account of the various kinds of descriptions present in practical reasoning and an 
increased comprehension of the roles they might play in different theoretical frameworks. That is 
why, from a methodological point of view, O'Neill's divide proves to be irrelevant and misguiding, 
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